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Article

The Problem of Authority:
Revisiting the Service Conception
Joseph Raz†
The problem I have in mind is the problem of the possible
justification of subjecting one’s will to that of another, and of
the normative standing of demands to do so. The account of authority that I offered, many years ago,1 under the title of the
service conception of authority, addressed this issue, and assumed that all other problems regarding authority are subsumed under it. Many found the account implausible. It is thin,
relying on very few ideas. It may well appear to be too thin, and
to depart too far from many of the ideas that have gained currency in the history of reflection on authority.
Criticism can be radical, rejecting the service conception
altogether. Or it can be more moderate, accepting the service
conception or some of its central traits, especially the normal
justification thesis, as setting necessary conditions for the legitimacy of authority, but denying that they constitute sufficient conditions. Most commonly, moderate critics argue that
legitimate authority, at any rate legitimate political authority,
presupposes a special connection between rulers and ruled, a
special bond that is overlooked by the service conception. My
purpose is to revisit the problem of authority, and to examine
moderately critical claims, or some of them. I will start by explaining in the first section some background methodological
† Professor of the Philosophy of Law, Oxford University and professor at
Columbia Law School. In writing this Article I benefited from oral or published comments on my ideas by more people than I remember. Among those
to whom I owe a debt of gratitude are Jules Coleman, Ronald Dworkin, Lesley
Green, Herbert Hart, Scott Hershovitz, Heidi Hurd, Michael Moore, Stephen
Perry, Donald Regan, Philip Soper, Jeremy Waldron—most of whom will find
my response to the comments inadequate. Copyright © 2006 by Joseph Raz.
1. Some of the basic ideas appear in JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF
LAW (1979); the main elements of the service conception are set out in JOSEPH
RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).
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points. Part II will briefly restate the service conception and
the way it deals with the problem of authority. Part III develops the service conception and elaborates some of its implications by dealing with a series of only loosely connected questions and doubts to which it is open. Part IV examines in
general terms the argument that authority, at any rate political
authority, presupposes a special link, missing in the service
conception, between government and the governed. Part V considers the possibility that such a link is forged by consent,
whereas Part VI comments on the possibility that the link is
constituted by identification with or membership of the political
community (or some other group).
I. SOME METHODOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS
A few observations about the general approach to start
with.
First, authority, political obligation, and obligation to obey
the law: Some writers think that the so-called political obligation is to obey the law, and that one has an obligation to obey
the law if and only if the law or legal institutions have legitimate authority. That is a mistake, and it is so even if we confine our attention to legal authorities alone. Political obligation
is the broadest of the three notions, signifying the obligations
members of a political community have towards it or its institutions and political order, in virtue of their membership. That
includes much more and much less than an obligation to obey
the law. More—because it includes some duties to be a good
citizen in ways that have little to do with the law. They will be
duties to react to injustice perpetrated by or in the name of the
community, to contribute to its proper functioning (e.g., by voting and by being active in various other ways), and more. They
require less than obeying the law, for much of the law has nothing to do with the political community. If I pick my neighbor’s
apple and eat it, I may be breaking the law, but I am unlikely
to be doing any harm to the polity. Obligations to obey the law
need not depend on the legitimacy of its authorities. There
could be various reasons, including moral reasons, to obey the
law in a country whose legal authorities are not legitimate.
Considerations of stability and the protection of vested interests are often thought to provide such reasons.2 Finally, it is
2. Various legal systems recognize such reasons by having doctrines giving legal effect to de facto authorities.
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worth mentioning that we have political duties that do not depend either on membership in a political community or on being subject to its laws. Rawls’s duty to uphold and support just
institutions is of this kind, applying to all of us, regarding any
just institutions, wherever they are.3 This Article deals exclusively with the nature of authority.
Second, power and right: In our common use of the concept
of authority, power and the right to it intermingle. Any attempt
to separate them is bound to be somewhat artificial. Yet it must
be made, for they seem to be interrelated in some systematic
way, which invites describing their distinctive contributions to
the concept of authority. My suggestion was that even the notion of a mere de facto authority (i.e., one that exercises power
over its subjects, but lacks the right to it) involves that of legitimacy. What makes mere de facto authorities different from
people or groups who exert naked power (e.g., through terrorizing a population or manipulating it) is that mere de facto authorities claim, and those who have naked power do not, to
have a right to rule those subject to their power. They claim legitimacy. They act, as I say, under the guise of legitimacy.4
On the other hand, I suggested, legitimate authorities are
not always de facto authorities. Arguably, the legitimate government of Poland in 1940 was the government in exile in London, which did not enjoy power over the population of Poland.5
The resulting methodology applies to the clarification of other
concepts too: there is a class of normative concepts that have a
secondary use in which they indicate a claim by their users, or
some of them, that they apply in their primary, normative,

3. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 293–94 (rev. ed. 1999).
4. Even those who do not claim a right to rule do—exceptional cases
apart—claim that they may act as they do, that their actions are defensible.
But they do not claim that those over whom they wield power owe them obedience, i.e., have a duty to obey them. They are content with being able to make
them obey, by credible threats or in some other way.
5. Possibly the government in exile enjoyed some de facto powers (there
was a Polish army—also in exile—that recognized it, etc.), but its legitimacy
did not depend on its possession of that power. Its legitimacy depended, however, on a nonnormative fact, on being recognized as legitimate by the bulk of
the Polish population and by some other countries. In other circumstances legitimacy may depend on the chance of the government gaining effective control. This enables one to keep the distinction between authority without the
power to use it effectively, and someone who is entitled to have authority (say,
was duly elected) but does not have it (because, e.g., he was not admitted to
the office to which he was elected). Contrast with this case a parent who has
authority over his child even though he lacks power over him.
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sense, a claim that may be erroneous. The most important concept of this kind is that of a (normative) reason.6 A reason for
an action is a consideration that renders its choice intelligible,
and counts in its favor. But when I say “my reason for leaving
was that I was afraid of missing the last bus,” I indicate what
reason I believed at the time I had for leaving (the fact that I
will miss the last bus if I do not leave), though I am not committed to the fact that there was in fact such a reason.
If that is right, then the concept of legitimate authority has
explanatory priority over that of a mere de facto authority. The
latter presupposes the former but not the other way around.
From here on “authority” refers to legitimate authority.
Third, concept possession and its application: It is not literally true that “authority” is a concept that applies only to
people who think that it applies to them. There can be authorities who do not claim to have authority. However, as just explained, de facto authorities do claim to have legitimate authority, and as will be seen below, political authorities generally do
so. The question arises whether it is a condition of adequacy of
an explanation of the concept of authority that those who have
authority at least implicitly accept the explanation as correct.
(Alternatively, can one accept an explanation of the concept as
of limited validity, as applying only to people—perhaps in authority, or perhaps subject to authority—who at least implicitly
take it to be a true explanation?)
No. If people dispute an account of authority that is otherwise well supported, they make a mistake. The service conception is an account of authority, which includes an explanation
of what it is to have authority, to be subject to authority, when
one has authority or is subject to it, and like questions. The account is not about what people think it is like to have authority
or to be subject to it, but of what it is to have it or be subject to
it. It is compatible with claims that people have different beliefs on these matters, though it follows from the account that
theirs are mistaken beliefs. Does it follow that they are guilty
of a conceptual confusion? Worse, does it follow that they do not
know their own language? Of course not. If they have false beliefs about authority (not merely about the powers of people
who actually have authority) then they have the concept of au-

6. I qualify them as “normative” to distinguish between them and explanatory reasons, which are simply facts or events that explain how or why
things are.
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thority, they have some understanding of what it involves. But
their understanding is partial, and in part incorrect. Our understanding of concepts usually is. It leaves plenty of room for
mistakes and disagreements.7
Fourth, hopes of neutrality: Some writers take their task to
be to provide an explanation of normative concepts, such as
“authority,” which is normatively neutral, that is consistent
with any possible normative view.8 It is not clear whether there
is a sense in which this can be a reasonable demand. If it is satisfied only by explaining normative concepts exclusively in nonnormative (or nonevaluative) terms, it amounts to a requirement of semantic reduction of all the normative concepts to
which it applies, and in that form there is no reason to accept it
as a general methodological requirement. Alternatively, it may
be taken to require that, while explanations of normative concepts may rely on other normative or evaluative concepts, these
must be ones which anyone, whatever their normative or
evaluative beliefs, is committed to accept as possibly9 having
true (or valid) instantiations. So understood, the requirement
gestures towards a semantic reduction of thick normative or
evaluative terms into thin ones. It is not clear, however, that
many normative terms meet this requirement. It is doubtful
that many thick concepts can be reduced to thin ones.
Perhaps the neutrality requirement should be taken as a
matter of degree: the closer an explanation comes to satisfying
it, the better it is, other things being equal. After all, explanations that meet the requirement, or rather concepts that they
successfully explain, can be accepted and used by people whatever their normative beliefs.
Some people suppose that the explanation of authority
should be normatively neutral in a different sense. They think
that the explanation of authority should be such that it is possible for the propositional form “X has authority over Y,” to
have true instances, that it is possible for someone to be a legitimate authority over others. Let me call the first kind of
normative neutrality “explanatory neutrality,” and the second
7. See Joseph Raz, Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial Comparison, in HART’S POSTCRIPT 1 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001).
8. For example, if a correct explanation of dishonor entails that (a) those
who acted dishonorably deserve to be killed, and (b) that anyone who betrayed
a trust acted dishonorably, then this explanation is inconsistent with my normative views.
9. In the nonepistemic sense of “possibly.”
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kind “existential neutrality.”
Existential neutrality has the advantage that it does not
conflict with the view that there can be legitimate authorities,
a view that is very widely held, and has been throughout history, wherever people had views on the topic. People can make
mistakes, including normative mistakes, but an explanation of
a concept in wide use and more or less universally believed to
have applications, which, in combination with true normative
beliefs, entails that it has none, has a tall task of explaining
how it is that people are so mistaken.
It is possible to exaggerate the difficulty of the task. First,
it is possible to explain how people are generally mistaken
about the possibility of legitimate authority without attributing
to them a gross misunderstanding of the concept. Their mistake, if mistaken they are, may be in some of their normative
beliefs, rather than in their conceptual understanding.10 Second, concepts have a history, and the conditions of their persistence or identity through time are, at best, very vague. Hence it
may be that the impossibility of legitimate authority is the impossibility of there being instances of our current concept of authority. Possibly, under some ancestors of our concept, legitimate authority was possible. The reverse is also possible, and
even more likely. One source of pressure towards concept
change may have been a growing realization that the concept
then prevailing has no instances (e.g., if ever the concept of authority was such that it had to derive from divine authority,
then recognition of the impossibility of divine authority may
have encouraged change in the concept, a change that made it
possible for it to have instances, at least in the eyes of the people at that time).
The account I offer has instances. But the hurdle of running against popular opinion can be higher or lower. For example, my account has the consequence that political authorities
are likely to have a more limited authority than the authority
many, perhaps all of them, claim to have, and that people generally believe that they have. This still requires explaining why
10. Out of abundance of caution, let me amplify here: there is no implication in the points above that an explanation of a concept to be correct must be
one generally available to those who have the concept. There are many aspects
of a concept that its users may not be aware of, and many mistakes about it
they may make. The claim was merely that there would need to be a good explanation of how a mistaken belief in the possibility of instances of the concept, in our case a belief in the possibility of legitimate authorities, came to be
so widespread.
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people are so mistaken,11 though since the mistake attributed
is less far-reaching, the burden of explanation is much less.
My previous comments explained what advantages I find
in both explanatory and existential neutrality. They fall short
of making either a methodological principle. I suspect that the
demand for explanatory neutrality is impossible to meet (i.e.,
explanations that meet it, if there are such, are otherwise
faulty). There is not much plausibility in it. We do not expect
all scientific concepts, for example, to be explanatorily neutral
in the sense of their instantiations being consistent with all
possible scientific theories. Some scientific concepts may be
theory-transcendent, or they may be more or less theorytranscendent. But many are not. Mutatis mutandis, the same, I
suspect, is true of normative concepts. The same considerations
would rule out the requirement of existential neutrality. Special cases apart, it is not a requirement we normally impose on
the explanation of other concepts, and it seems unmotivated to
impose it on normative concepts generally or on authority in
particular.
The hope for neutrality may express itself in a requirement
that the account of authority should explain what follows when
someone has authority, but will not include anything about the
conditions under which one may acquire or hold authority. For
this requirement to make sense, it has to be the case not only
that whoever offers the account does not write about the conditions under which one does hold authority, but also that nothing follows from the account regarding the conditions that
make one an authority. This seems to be an impossible requirement to meet: how could it be that the way to justify a
claim that one has authority is not affected by, indeed not
guided by what has to be justified, namely the consequences of
having authority?
Still, there is a difference between the two parts of the account of authority. One can reasonably expect an account of authority to specify, however abstractly, all or at least the central
consequences of having authority. However, beyond saying that
the conditions under which one holds authority are those that
justify ascribing authority—namely, ascribing to one’s actions
the consequences that follow from having authority—it is not
clear that one can reasonably hope for a complete specification
of those conditions. If one provides some sufficient conditions
11. A point made to me privately by H.L.A. Hart.
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for having authority, the question arises: can it be established
that no other conditions establish one as an authority? Establishing a negative existential is notoriously difficult, and while
I tried to make the account that follows exhaustive, I do not
have an argument to show that it is.
Fifth, concept possession and the limits of its application:
The remark about the historicity of the concept of authority
calls for a couple of brief clarifications. It implies two possibilities: first, that there was a time when the concept did not exist
at all, and second, that our concept is a descendent of earlier
concepts. It is plausible to think that both are realized, which
explains how the term is used: sometimes to refer to the whole
series of concepts that are the ancestors of our concept, sometimes to our concept alone.
Does it not follow that there is a wider concept, which is
used whenever we use the term in the first way, i.e., to refer to
what I called the whole series of ancestral concepts? And is it
not the real concept of authority? Yes and no. Yes, for there is
such a general concept. No, because it is misleading to identify
the general concept with the concept of authority simpliciter.
The main reason is that the way, and I think the only way, in
which the broad notion can be identified is as I did identify it,
i.e., historically, as the concept that applies to all instances of
what I called “our” concept of authority and those of its ancestors (rather than by its ahistorical features). “Our” concept is
the concept of authority, if only because it is our point of access
to all its ancestors, which are identified by their relations to it.
It is also true that we need the wider concept, or rather
that we regularly rely on it. For example, and crucially, there
can be no de facto authority among people who do not have the
concept of authority, for to have de facto authority is, among
other things, to claim legitimate authority. It follows that when
we talk of the de facto authorities existing in the middle ages,
or in fifteenth-century Japan, or in Ancient Persia, we rely on
something like the broad concept: there were at that time people or bodies with power over populations who claimed authority over them, using here the appropriate ancestor of our concept, or the wide concept, which includes all ancestors.
One concept is an ancestor if the successor concept
emerged as a modification of the ancestral one and retained
sufficient similarity to it, either in its features or its function.
The relationship is not typically one of similarity alone. It contains a contingent causal component. Typically when that does
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not exist, as when we find in a different culture a causally unrelated but similar concept, we would identify it just like that:
“They,” we would say, “also had a concept like (or similar to)
our concept of ——.” On the other hand, similarity is part of the
ancestral relationship, for otherwise we would have no criteria
to distinguish between a concept being modified by a successor
and one rejected in favor of an alternative.
Needless to say, since the broad concept is identified by its
relations to our concept and its ancestors, and since “our” concept can change over time and acquire more ancestors, the
overall concept we have now is different from the one we had,
or will have, when “our” concept was or will become different.
Sixth, explanation and advocacy: I keep referring to “our”
concept of authority. But is there such a thing? Are there not
several concepts, all of them descending from the very same
ancestors? Quite possibly so. Each person when using the concept of authority uses his concept, and should allow for the possibility that there are several. That does not lead to an explosion of concepts. The reason is simple: in the use of concepts we
allow that we are ignorant about many aspects of them, that
we may use them incorrectly, and that their character is determined by the rules governing their use in the community,
rules whose complete understanding may elude any or indeed
all of us. In allowing the possibility of at least partial ignorance
regarding the nature of our concepts, we recognize that concepts are social beings, owing their features to a community of
speakers in ways that may elude any one of them, or indeed all
of them. This means that our concepts are not very idiosyncratic, that there are common concepts, even though we may
not know all their features.
Needless to say, if there are a number of concepts of authority prevalent in a single society, they are likely to be competitors. The boundaries between them are fluid, and those who
use each claim merit for it, and (when aware, if only dimly, of
the existence of the others) find reason to prefer it to the others. This means that each explanation of a concept can also be
used in the battle of concepts, where there is such a battle; that
is, it can be used to advocate the merits of one concept over its
competitors.
The indeterminacy of concepts is another factor forcing all
explanations to enter, if successful, into the advocacy business.
Explanations may strive to replicate the indeterminacies of the
concepts they explain, but it is almost impossible to replicate
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them perfectly, and the success of the explanation will inevitably exercise some influence towards changing the concept to
make it conform to its explanation.
II. THE SERVICE CONCEPTION IN BRIEF
The service conception is driven by two problems, one theoretical and one moral. Starting with the common thought,
which broadly speaking and with appropriate qualifications
and amplifications I endorse, that authority is a right to rule,
the theoretical question is how to understand the standing of
an authoritative directive (as I shall call the product of the exercise of the right to rule). If issued by someone who has a right
to rule, then its recipients are bound to obey. The directive is
binding on them and they are duty-bound to obey it.12 But how
could it be that the say-so of one person constitutes a reason, a
duty, for another? Is it that easy to manufacture duties out of
thin air?
The moral question is how can it ever be that one has a
duty to subject one’s will and judgment to those of another? Of
course, we are affected by others and by the actions of others in
innumerable ways. We often act to induce others to help or not
to hinder us, to collaborate with us in common enterprises, to
avoid hurting us or to turn their actions to our advantage. But
the case of authority is special. Directives issued by authority
aim to constitute reasons for their subjects and are binding on
their subjects because they are meant to be so binding. If we
recognize a duty to obey them we recognize that they have a
right to command us, not only to affect the circumstances that
shape our opportunities and the obstacles on our path. Authorities tell us what to intend, with the aim of achieving whatever
goals they pursue through commanding our will. Can one human being ever have such normative power over another? Can
it ever be right to acknowledge such power over oneself in another?
The theoretical problem is similar to the one that promises
(and all voluntary undertakings) present. By promising, we im12. Authorities do much more than impose duties. But arguably whatever
they do—confer powers or rights, grant permissions or immunities, change
status, create and terminate legal persons (corporations and their like), regulate the relations between organs of legal persons, and much else—they do by
imposing duties, actual or conditional. I will therefore continue, as writers on
authority generally do, to discuss the problem of authority in relation to its
right to impose duties.
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pose on ourselves obligations that we did not have before, and
we do so simply by communicating an intention to do so. In exercising authority we impose on others duties that they did not
have before, and we do so simply by expressing an intention to
do so.13 How can actions communicating intentions to create
reasons or obligations (for ourselves or others) do so just because they communicate these intentions?
The beginning of the answer is to note that fundamentally
there is nothing special in such a case. Various of our actions
incur obligations. Conceiving and giving birth to a child is often
assumed to be one such case. Infringing other people’s rights is
another (it generates an obligation to make amends, etc.).
Claims that we have an obligation because of what we did, or
because of how we acted, are true, if they are, by virtue of general reasons for people who acted in certain ways to have certain reasons or obligations. There are, it is assumed, general
reasons for anyone who has a child to look after it, a general
reason for anyone who violates another’s right, to compensate
them, and so on.
Promises and authorities are no exception. Not every time
someone acts with the intention of undertaking an obligation
towards someone does he or she make a binding promise. A
promise is binding only if the promised action is of a class regarding which there are sufficient reasons to hold the promisor
bound by his promise. That means that to be binding, promises
must meet many conditions: the promisor must be capable of
knowing the meaning of his action, he must be capable of having a reasonable understanding of its likely consequences, and,
most importantly, (a) the act promised must belong to a class of
actions such that it enhances people’s control over their life to
be able to make such promises, and (b) the act must not be
grossly immoral, etc. A promise to be a slave is not binding, nor
a promise to make someone else a slave, and so on.
The theoretical question regarding the nature of authority
is answered in a similar fashion. A person can have authority
over another only if there are sufficient reasons for the latter to
be subject to duties at the say-so of the former. That, of course,
while probably right, does not tell us when one person has au13. In both cases, sometimes the person placed under an obligation already had an obligation to perform the same act. “An obligation that he did
not have before” does not mean an obligation to do something which until then
he had no obligation to do. The obligation is new, even if another obligation to
perform the same act already exists.
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thority over another. It does not establish even that anyone can
ever have authority. But it states what has to be the case if
some people have authority over others. That is all that one can
ask of a general account of authority, namely that it establish
what it takes for there to be legitimate authority, rather than
that it should show who has authority over whom and regarding what. That latter task is a matter for evaluating individual
cases. But of course, a general account of authority can, while
still not establishing who actually has authority, say much
more about the conditions under which people are subject to
authority. In particular we would expect it to address the moral
problem with authority, namely, how can it be consistent with
one’s standing as a person to be subject to the will of another in
the way one is when subject to the authority of another?
The suggestion of the service conception is that the moral
question is answered when two conditions are met, and regarding matters with respect to which they are met: First, that the
subject would better conform to reasons that apply to him anyway (that is, to reasons other than the directives of the authority) if he intends14 to be guided by the authority’s directives
than if he does not (I will refer to it as the normal justification
thesis or condition). Second, that the matters regarding which
the first condition is met are such that with respect to them it
is better to conform to reason than to decide for oneself, unaided by authority (I will refer to it as the independence condition).
Simple examples of regulations regarding dangerous activities or materials illustrate the point. I can best avoid endangering myself and others by conforming to the law regarding the dispensation and use of pharmaceutical products. I can
rely on the experts whose advice it reflects to know what is
dangerous in these matters better than I can judge for myself, a
fact that is reinforced by my reliance on other people’s conformity to the law, which enables me to act with safety in ways
that otherwise I could not. Of course, none of this is necessarily
so. The law may reflect the interests of pharmaceutical companies, and not those of consumers. If that is so it may lack au14. Perhaps I should say “tries” rather than “intends” to cover cases
where even though one intends to be guided by the authority one will fail to do
so because of one’s weakness of will, and would therefore do better to ignore
the authority and try to conform to background reasons. There are probably
endless refinements of this kind, which I will not try to provide, and which are
probably impossible to enumerate.
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thority over me because it fails to meet the normal justification
condition.15 But if it does meet the normal justification condition it is likely to meet the independence condition as well. Decisions about the safety of pharmaceutical products are not the
sort of personal decisions regarding which I should decide for
myself rather than follow authority. They do not require me to
use any drugs, etc., and in that they are unlike decisions about
undergoing a course of medication or treatment where we may
well feel that I should decide for myself, rather than be dictated
to by authority.
I said that the two conditions solve the moral question
about authority. But in what sense do they do so? Several objections can be anticipated. The independence condition, it may
be objected, merely restates the problem and does not help with
its solution. The whole point of the moral problem is that acting
by oneself is more important than anything. What advance is
there in stating that authority is legitimate only where acting
by oneself is less important than conforming to reason?
Another objection to the independence condition has it that
it suggests that one can compare the importance of conforming
to reason with the importance of deciding for oneself, independently of authority. But this, says the objection, cannot be done:
the two are very different, incommensurable concerns. There is
never an answer to the question which of the two is more important? I doubt that this objection is valid. It seems to be
premised on the thought that the concerns that underlie reasons with which we should conform and those that underlie the
reason to act independently of authority have nothing to do
with each other. But that is not so.
Some of the reasons for relying on one’s own judgment derive from the need to cultivate the ability to be self-reliant,
simply because often one has no one else to rely on. The clearest case is the way parents should allow their children freedom
to decide for themselves on a gradually expanding range of
matters, in spite of knowing that they, the parents, would make
a better choice for their children were they to take over deciding on those matters. This is the way children learn how to decide for themselves and become self-reliant. There are other
reasons to decide for oneself. Certain matters are, by the social
15. For the purpose of the example only, I disregard the complicating fact
that the law’s authority is wider than regarding the possession and use of
pharmaceutical products. This raises the question of the unit of assessment in
determinations of the legitimacy of authorities, which is discussed below.
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forms of various cultures, to be decided by oneself. For example,
while in some forms of marriage parents choose the partners, in
others neither parents nor anyone else are expected to have
any say in the matter. In such cases one cannot have the relationship, or engage in the good or the activity, unless one does
so oneself, not through an agent, nor by following a superior.
The former case for self-reliance (parents and children) is
instrumental where the end is to secure what conformity with
reason will, in the long run, secure; the latter case (marriage)
depends on the fact that there are reasons that can only be satisfied by independent action.16 Both of them trace the concerns
behind independence back to concerns with satisfying reasons.
The thought that the two concerns never meet and must be incommensurate is unjustified. The question of the role of what I
called independence also involves other, perhaps more fundamental considerations. We are not fully ourselves if too many of
our decisions are not taken by us, but by agents, automata, or
superiors. On the other side, sometimes it is our duty, our
moral duty if you like, to accept authority. Sometimes—for example, on the scene of an accident—coordination, which in the
circumstances requires recognizing someone as being in charge
of the rescue, is essential if lives are to be saved. We must yield
to the authority, where there is someone capable of playing this
role. There are in the political sphere many less dramatic analogues of such situations, where a substantial good is at stake,
a good that we have moral reasons to secure for ourselves and
for others but that can in the circumstances be best secured by
yielding to a coordinating authority. These cases justify giving
up deciding for oneself, and pose no threat to the authenticity
of one’s life, or to one’s ability to lead a self-reliant and selffulfilling life. None of this denies that often the two concerns,
one satisfied by conformity with reasons, the other by acting on
one’s own judgment, may be radically different, and the cases
for conformity or independence may be incommensurate, with
the (uncomfortable) result that whether one is then subject to
authority is undetermined.
The other objection to the autonomy condition cannot be
dismissed so easily. It should be met not by a refutation but by
a deflection. Indeed, the independence condition does little to
solve the problem. That is not its task. It merely frames the
16. I turned to the notion of second order reasons to express such situations. They involve reasons to act for a certain reason, and the faculty of reason discharges its function when we conform with that second order reason.
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question. Part of the answer to the moral challenge to all authority is in the first condition, which says that authority can
be legitimate if conformity with it improves one’s conformity
with reason.17 It provides the key to the justification of authority: authority helps our rational capacity whose function is to
secure conformity with reason. It allows our rational capacity
to achieve its purpose more successfully. These observations
express a way of understanding our general capacity to guide
our conduct (and our life more broadly) by our own judgment.
The point of this general capacity is to enable us to conform to
the reasons that confront us at any given time. It is conformity
achieved by the exercise of one’s judgment. We value the ability
to exercise one’s judgment and to rely on it in action, but it is a
capacity we value because of its purpose, which is, by its very
nature, to secure conformity with reason. The point is perfectly
general. The value of many of our capacities should not be reduced to the value of their use. But, even where their value also
reflects the value of the freedom to use our capacities or not,18
it depends on the value of their successful use.
The value of our rational capacity, i.e., our capacity to form
a view of our situation in the world and to act in light of it, derives from the fact that there are reasons that we should satisfy, and that this capacity enables us to do so. It is not, however, our only way of conforming to reasons. We are, e.g.,
hardwired to be alert to certain dangers and react to them instinctively and without deliberation, as we react to fire or to
sudden movement in our immediate vicinity. In other contexts
we do better to follow our emotions than to reason our way to
action. These examples suggest that the primary value of our
general ability to act by our own judgment derives from the
concern to conform to reasons, and that concern can be met in a
variety of ways. It is not, therefore, surprising that we find it
met also in ways that come closer to obeying authority, such as
making vows, taking advice, binding oneself to others long before the time for action with a promise to act in certain ways, or
relying on technical devices to “take decisions for us,” as when
setting alarm clocks, speed limiters, etc.
17. For the sake of brevity I’ll use this and other similarly inaccurate restatements of the first condition.
18. In fact, while we can manipulate ourselves through substance abuse
or in some other way into losing, for a short or a long period, the use of our rational capacity, it is not one that we can use or refrain from using at will, as
we can our capacity to read books.
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Both being guided by our emotions and being guided by our
judgment (not necessarily mutually exclusive conditions) are
constituents of some activities and relationships that are valuable in themselves, resulting in cases where the independence
condition of legitimacy is not satisfied. By the same token,
there can be other forms of activities, joint activities and enterprises, which are valuable in themselves and that inherently
involve yielding to decisions taken by others. The conditions of
legitimacy are open to different views about what is and what
is not valuable and worthwhile. They merely state how conclusions on such issues bear on the question of authority.
In postulating that authorities are legitimate only if their
directives enable their subjects to better conform to reason, we
see authority for what it is: not a denial of people’s capacity for
rational action, but simply one device, one method, through the
use of which people can achieve the goal (telos) of their capacity
for rational action, albeit not through its direct use. This way of
understanding matters is reinforced by the fact that in following authority, just as in following advice, or being guided by
any of the technical devices, one’s ultimate self-reliance is preserved, for it is one’s own judgment which directs one to recognize the authority of another, just as it directs one to keep one’s
promises, follow advice, use technical devices and the like.
Of course, authority is special in the way in which it restricts one’s ability to act independently. The service conception
expresses that thought by the thesis that authoritative directives preempt those reasons against the conduct they require
that the authority was meant to take into account in deciding
to issue its directives. Those subject to the authority are not allowed to second guess the wisdom or advisability of the authority’s directives. A simplified description of typical situations explains the point. There are reasons with which we should all
conform, say regarding safe driving. In the absence of the law
(or other authoritative directives) telling us how to drive (by
imposing speed restrictions, traffic lights, road signs, etc.), we
would have tried to drive as safely as we can. The law of the
road is meant to enable us to drive more safely (i.e., to conform
better to the background reasons), and it does so by directing
us to do things that otherwise we might not have done. Where
the law leaves driving decisions to us, we are still guided by
those background considerations. But where it intervenes to
require certain ways of driving, we are bound to obey it, and
are not allowed to question its force, even while we are, of
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course, allowed to question its wisdom and advocate its reform.
This is, roughly, what I mean when I say that legitimate laws,
and the directives of legitimate authorities generally, preempt
the background reasons that might militate against the authoritative directives and replace them with their own requirements.19
The preemptive force of authority is part and parcel of its
nature. It cannot succeed as an authority (i.e., succeed in improving our conformity with reason) if it does not preempt the
background reasons. The function of authorities is to improve
our conformity with those background reasons by making us
try to follow their instructions rather than the background reasons. Authorities cannot do so without at least the possibility
that their directives will sometimes lead us to act differently
than we would have done without them. In itself, while this requires that the authority’s directives must be capable of changing what we ought to do, all things considered, it does not specify in what way they impact on what we have most reason to
do. The preemption thesis explains that: it reflects the thought
that authorities are able to function in the way described because their decrees are the product of decisions by agents who
themselves are set on determining what it is that we ought to
do, and direct us to do so. They constitute legitimate authorities when doing so will in fact achieve the result of conforming
better to reason (while respecting what reasons there are for us
to determine our actions by our unhindered judgment). The fact
that this is how they operate indicates that when they are legitimate their decrees should replace the background reasons.
They preempt them. How much is preempted? What count as
background reasons? They are the reasons that the authority
was meant to consider in issuing its directives, provided, of
course, that it acts within its legitimate power.
The preemptive standing of authoritative directives shows
why the moral question about the law is a serious one. It shows
what truth there is in the saying that in accepting authority we
surrender our judgment to the authority. At the same time the
19. I do not wish to indulge in excessively detailed analysis, but it is
worth noting that there are two kinds of reasons the preemption thesis affects:
First, it preempts reasons against the conduct required by the authoritative
directive. Second, it preempts reasons that do not necessarily bear on the pros
and cons of behaving as the directive requires, but that do militate against the
desirability of issuing the directive. These may be that the matter should be
left to individual discretion, or that the directive will have undesirable side
effects that make it undesirable, and so on.
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solution of the theoretical problem shows that, in spite of its
special character, authority, when subjected to the normal justification and the independence conditions, is just another case
of the world confronting us with reasons for action. The theoretical puzzle was “how can people create reasons by acting
with the intention of doing so?” The answer is that this is so
when considerations that are independent of human will make
it so.
Yet again we see the analogy (as well as the difference) between authority and promises. Both yield reasons generated by
actions designed to do so, a fact that gives both of them their
puzzling air, and both can do so because considerations independent of human will validate such creation of reasons. Therefore, in following both, we follow reason, and thus exercise our
judgment—though in both cases we do it at one remove—by accepting, through our judgment, the binding force of acts (promises, directives) that preempt our freedom to act for some of the
background reasons. It is true that only authority involves accepting the directives of another. But if the two conditions are
right, even authoritative directives, just like promises, are
binding because and where they improve our powers by enabling us to conform to reason better than we could without
them.
III. REFINEMENTS AND ELABORATIONS
So far I have tried to sketch the outlines of the service conception and to explain how it contends with two basic problems
about authority. Its success in dealing with them is the main
case for believing that it is along the right lines. But to establish itself the account has to deal with a whole host of additional difficulties. In this section I will briefly look at a range of
difficulties, reflection on which leads to refining the account, as
well as displaying some of its strengths.
A. CAN WE BE SUBJECT TO SEVERAL AUTHORITIES AT THE SAME
TIME?
Of course we can. The more difficult question is whether
we can be subject to more than one authority regarding the
same subject matter at the same time. The normal justification
thesis is based on a contrast between how I would act if unaffected by the authority compared with how I would act when
trying to follow the authority. In the context, this is ambiguous.
Does it mean “how I would act when not influenced by any au-
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thority”? or, “how I would act when not trying to follow this
particular authority”? The first question allows for the possibility that we are subject to several authorities at the same time
and regarding the same matter. This is as it should be. We can
be subject to the authority of our parents, of our schools, and of
the law, for example, at the same time, and regarding the same
issue.
When subject to several authorities with similar or overlapping jurisdictions, certain matters may be regulated by one
authority, while the others remain silent on them. We should,
in such cases, follow those who issue directives on the matter.
When several authorities pronounce on the same matter and
their directives conflict, we must decide, to the best of our ability, which is more reliable as a guide. Often there are cooperative relations among authorities. The law recognizes the authority of schools and of parents, for example, and lends them
legal authority, by directing the relevant people to obey them,
or by enforcing their directives through legal procedures. At
other times authorities may be hostile to each other, directing
their subjects not to obey, and more generally not to cooperate
with the working of other authorities. In such cases the question whether a given authority’s power extends to exclude the
authority of another is to be judged in the way we judge the legitimacy of its power on any matter, namely, whether we would
conform better to reason by trying to follow its directives than
if we do not.
B. PREEMPTION AND ACTING FOR THE BEST REASONS
Often we have more than one sufficient reason to do something. An authoritative directive may direct us to do something
that we should do for independent reasons anyway. For example, I may have promised a friend to drive slowly and the law
also instructs me to drive slowly. If I drive slowly, I may do so
because of the promise alone, not being aware of the law or not
caring to obey it, or I may do so because of the law alone, or because of both, or for yet another consideration that appears to
be a cogent reason, but may not be.
Such situations raise no problems. But the law involves a
different kind of overdetermination. By law we must not murder, but we also have an independent reason not to murder,
namely respect for human life. This case is typical of many.
Another kind of overdetermination is somewhat different. We
have a reason independent of the law to contribute our share
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towards meeting the cost of maintaining communal services.
The law imposes a duty to pay tax as a way of doing so. Independently of the law, we do not have a reason to pay the precise
sum we owe as tax. But once the law is there we have two reasons, we may want to say, to pay the sum that we owe as tax
(we can disregard here that the tax law is likely to serve other
purposes as well). One is our obligation to obey the law, the
other our duty to contribute to the cost of community services.
Ideally, we would refrain from killing exclusively out of respect for people’s lives, and not at all out of respect for the law.
Ideally, we should pay our tax because we owe it as our share
towards the cost of community services, as well as because the
law demands it. Is this consistent with the preemption thesis?
A proper understanding of preemption removes any suspicion of a problem. A binding authoritative directive is not only
a reason for behaving as it directs, but also an exclusionary
reason, that is, a reason for not following (i.e., not acting for)
reasons that conflict with the rule. That is how authoritative
directives preempt. They exclude reliance on conflicting reasons, not all conflicting reasons, but those that the lawmaker
was meant to consider before issuing the directive. These exclusionary reasons do not, of course, exclude relying on reasons
for behaving in the same way as the directive requires. Think
about it: authority improves our conformity with reason by
overriding what we would do without it, when doing so would
not conform with reason. So, assuming that it is entirely successful in its task, it need not and does not stop us from following the reasons on the winning side of an argument. It must,
however, if it is to improve our conformity with reason, override
our inclination to follow reasons on the losing side of the argument. Hence the preemption excludes only reasons that conflict
with the authority’s directive.
So when an action is rightly required by authority (i.e.,
when there are conclusive reasons for it, independently of the
authority’s intervention), we may (in both senses) do as we are
required either because we are so required, or for the reasons
that justify the requirement, or both. Sometimes, as in the case
of the prohibition of murder, doing as required by authority for
cogent reasons other than that the conduct is so required, is the
better option. There will be other cases, for example, cases in
which the directive issued by authority is mistaken or unjustified. It requires some action, the performance of which, while
supported by some authority-independent reasons, is not suffi-
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ciently supported to require that action, not if the directive requiring it is ignored. This can be consistent with the directive
being binding on us. Even legitimate authorities make mistakes. In such cases we should conform with the directive, and
the ideal case is one in which we do so because we are required
to by the authority and not because of the other reasons that
support the action.
The tax example was different because we do not have a
reason independent of the law to pay exactly as required by law
and to pay it to this precise authority, even though once the law
is in place the reason that justifies passing it is a reason for doing as it requires, which is distinct from the general duty we
have to obey a legitimate authority. In such cases the best option is to act for both reasons, i.e., for both the law and the
background reason for it.
In what sense are these options best? All that is required of
us is to conform to reason, and it does not matter for what reason, or imagined reason, we do so. However, not only what we
do but why we do it tells something about us. It is regarding
such judgments, judgments about the agent, about what kind of
person he is, how he conducts himself and so on, that the actual
reasons that led him to action matter.
C. CONFLICTING REASONS
Authoritative directives are not always conclusive reasons
for the conduct they require. They can be defeated by conflicting reasons, or by conflicting directives. The reasons that can
defeat them are those they do not exclude. The question is of
some importance when considering the law. Typically, one rule
of law does not exclude another of the same rank (in the sense
in which constitutional rules, primary legislation, delegated
legislation, and common law are of different rank). Rules of law
exclude many nonlegal considerations, though legal systems
typically allow some to count and sometimes to override legal
requirements. But they do not exclude other legal rules of the
same rank. I will say that legal rules constitute prima facie
reasons for the conduct they prescribe.
When legal rules conflict, how is the outcome to be decided? There are many devices to which the law appeals for assistance. The problem arises when no formal device is available
or sufficient. The question is whether the relative merits of the
background reasons, those for and against each of the rules,
count in the correct determination of each such conflict. It ap-
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pears unreasonable to ignore these background reasons, for to
do so leaves no option but to take all rules of the same constitutional rank as counting in the same way and to the same degree towards the outcome. Given that one rule may be a trivial
one, say some minor tax regulation, while the other may be a
matter central to the protection of fundamental rights, it would
be unreasonable to take them to be of equal importance. Yet
does not the thesis that authoritative directives exclude reliance on conflicting considerations mean that one is not allowed
to assess the true importance of a rule, which would involve assessing both reasons for and reasons against it, and these include reasons for and against the conduct it prescribes?
However, the preemption thesis implies rejecting both alternatives. As mentioned, it excludes reference to the background considerations and thus precludes a proper assessment
of the importance of the rule. However, it does not follow that
all rules of the same constitutional rank must be seen as of the
same importance. Just as the authority makes the law, so it
does, or at least can, indicate its importance in its eyes. There
are various ways of doing so, mostly implicit, some more explicit, like preambles and other legislative material. Other indications are implied in the language the law was expressed in
and the context of its legislation. To the extent that judicial
practice instructs courts to resort to these devices, they are recognized as legally binding and have authoritative standing.
There is no denying that such considerations are unlikely
to determine all questions that may arise about the importance
of each legal rule. Nor can all issues arising out of conflicts
among legal rules be determined by prioritizing some over others. Often, instead of following one rule rather than the other,
practical conflicts should be resolved by finding the option that
satisfies the conflicting rules to the highest possible degree.
That follows from the nature of practical rationality, which requires that when reasons cannot be completely conformed to,
they should be conformed to, to the highest possible degree.
This will require courts confronted with conflicts of this kind to
find such an optimific outcome, which will involve an understanding of the point of the conflicting rules. We already saw
that this is consistent with the service conception.
Even so, not infrequently in different rules of law conflicts,
the law does not contain the resources to resolve the conflict. It
is indeterminate regarding the issue, usually leaving such decisions to the discretion of judges, i.e., to their judgment about
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the real merit of the different rules, a judgment that goes beyond what the law determines.
D. REASON AND KNOWABILITY
It is a matter of dispute whether a factor not known by
some agents, or not knowable by them, can nevertheless constitute a reason for those agents. Whatever is the truth on that
general question, there are independent reasons for thinking
that someone or some body can be an authority only if the fact
that the two conditions are met can be known to its subjects.
The point of being under an authority is that it opens a way of
improving one’s conformity with reason. One achieves that by
conforming to the authority’s directives, and (special circumstances apart) one can reliably conform only if one has reliable
beliefs regarding who has legitimate authority, and what its directives are. If one cannot have trustworthy beliefs that a certain body meets the conditions for legitimacy, then one’s belief
in its authority is haphazard, and cannot (again special circumstances apart) be reliable. Therefore, to fulfill its function, the
legitimacy of an authority must be knowable to its subjects.
In stating this argument I assumed that whenever one can
form reliable beliefs that the conditions for legitimacy are met,
one can also have knowledge that they are met. I was also relying on the fact that, generally speaking, the only reliable way of
conforming to authority is through having a reliable belief that
it is an authority, and therefore should be obeyed. This assumption helps with defining more precisely what has to be the
case for the legitimacy to be knowable. Since the point is to improve conformity with reason, there is at least a rough measure
of how important such improvement is. The more important it
is, the more extensive inquiries about ways of achieving it are
indicated. The indicated degree of inquiry sets the limit to
knowability: it is knowable if an inquiry of that kind would
yield that knowledge.
We engage in such assessments every day of the week. We
regularly need to decide how far to pursue an inquiry in the
hope of coming to a more reliable or more nuanced conclusion
about what is the right course of action on various occasions.
When the issue is of importance we extend our inquiries and
deliberations well beyond what we do when the matter is relatively trifling. The same kind of consideration applies to establishing the existence of authorities. How much it can be expected to improve our conformity to reason, and how important
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the matter is, establish what inquiry is reasonable to undertake. When reasonable inquiry will not reveal the case for authority, that case, if it exists at all, is unknowable. It follows
that people are not subject to any authority regarding those
matters.
This argument is used here to establish not merely that it
is not rational, or not worthwhile, to carry on with the inquiry
about the existence of certain reasons, but that those reasons,
authoritative directives, do not exist. There is no authority over
the matter, because to exist, authorities must be knowable.
This extension of the argument is not surprising. The service
conception makes the legitimacy of authorities turn primarily
on their value in achieving something beyond them, i.e., conformity to background reasons existing independently of them.
In general we have no reason to pursue the means unless they
are worth pursuing, given the cost of doing so relative to the
importance of the ends. To give one simple example: I suppose
that I can get you to give me five pounds by giving you ten
pounds on condition that you give me five pounds in return.
But (special circumstances apart) I have no reason to pursue
this means to that end, no reason at all. It is not merely the
case that I have a reason that is defeated by the cost of pursuing the means. The case of authority is not exactly the same,
but it is analogous: obeying Jane, let us say, would help me better to conform with reasons that apply to me. However, I cannot know that without pursuing an inquiry that would be irrational to pursue. It follows that I have no reason to obey Jane,
and it follows from that, that Jane has no authority over me.
E. SMALLEST CLASS
There are other epistemic constraints on the conditions of
legitimacy. They constrain the application of the substantive
conditions. For example, suppose we can establish that we will
conform better with reason if we follow authority regarding
matters in a certain domain, let us say matters dealt with in
work-safety regulations. Does the authority’s power extend
over the whole domain or is it limited to part of it only? The
normal justification condition may be taken to mean that it has
authority over the whole domain. But that encounters the objection that the domain can be artificially extended (e.g., by
adding to it safety at home) without any reason to believe that
we actually do better in the extensions themselves (e.g., we
may be better judges of safety in our homes than whoever is the
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authority over safety at work). The extended domain may still
meet both conditions of legitimacy simply because the narrower
domain meets them, and the disadvantages of the extension are
not bad enough to cancel out the case for the authority.
The solution to this conundrum is, I believe, that a person
or body has authority regarding any domain if that person or
body meets the conditions regarding that domain and there is
no proper part of the domain regarding which the person or
body can be known to fail the conditions.
F. BURDENS OF INQUIRY AND DECISION
The second, independence, condition of legitimacy is premised on the thought that it is important that people decide for
themselves how to conduct their lives, and that, especially in
some areas, they should do so with only limited reliance on direct advice, let alone commands, from others. We do not fully
live as autonomous persons if we do not decide for ourselves. It
does not follow, of course, that we always enjoy doing so. Some
people find the burden of decision hard to bear. They prevaricate, get depressed, feel oppressed and pressured, and, of
course, often decide unwisely, often deciding almost arbitrarily
in order to relieve themselves of the burden of decision.
Not everyone suffers from an aversion to taking decisions
and assuming responsibility, though most people feel the burden. We are tempted to think that one is not a responsible
agent if one does not, as it shows a lack of seriousness about
one’s actions. Be this as it may, everyone has to carry the burden of inquiry. It makes demands on our attention, energy,
time and resources. It may impose a strain on our relations
with others, and so on. To be sure, the process of purposeful inquiry, of working one’s way towards a decision, can also be enjoyable and rewarding in its own right. But given that its primary purpose and justification is that it contributes to a good
decision, one cannot expect the rewards to match the burdens,
and sometimes the burdens far exceed the rewards.
There are ways of reducing the burdens of decision and inquiry, and some of them involve shifting the burden onto others. The practice of relying on professional advice has grown in
recent times, perhaps in parallel with a decline in the family as
a source of advice and support in decision making. Submitting
to authority is one way of reducing the burdens. It can be justified only if it is consistent with the independence condition of
legitimacy (though when the psychological vulnerability to the
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burden is extreme it may be justified to mitigate the condition
to relieve the burden). The normal justification condition, however, is better understood broadly to allow that meeting the
burdens of decision and inquiry is one of the benefits authorities can bring.
G. RESPECT AND OTHER REASONS
We can accommodate the burdens of decision and inquiry
in an account of legitimate authority, either through an appropriate reading of the two conditions, or by recognizing these
burdens as additional factors bearing on legitimacy, factors
that modify or add to the two conditions. I do not believe that it
is possible to enumerate exhaustively the considerations that
can bear on the legitimacy of authority, or for that matter on
the justification of any other normative institution that is
widely accepted and is enshrined in social practices. Such institutions do sometimes have core purposes or points, but once
they are recognized and are followed in practice they become
enmeshed in other practices and concerns, which lead them,
without deflecting from their primary justification, to accrue
additional purposes and justifying reasons.
One such factor arises out of the way in which, in many societies, some authorities become the primary visible expression
of institutions to which they belong, and in the name of which
they function. Political and legal institutions with legal authority are a case in point. In many countries superior legal authorities are identified with the state or the country or the nation and speak in their name. Where this is so, respect for and
identification with the state, country or nation may be expressed in respect for legal authority, and that in turn takes
the form (among others) of trusting these institutions, taking it
on trust that they have authority to do what they do, not questioning their conduct too closely to see whether they exceed
their authority, etc. Trust is a general mark of respect, and a
natural one. If respect for the state, country or nation is desirable, which sometimes it is, and if it is appropriate, given the
circumstances of the society in question, for it to express itself
through respect and trust in its legal institutions, then a certain slackening of vigilance regarding the two conditions of legitimacy is also acceptable. That is, in such cases, while the
conditions themselves are unaffected, people would be justified
in maintaining that the government has authority on evidence
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that would not be sufficient to reach such conclusions but for
the trust they have in the government.
I do not maintain that people have a duty to trust and respect their government in that way. That would be like claiming that they have a duty to have someone as their friend. The
respect we are concerned with here is not the basic respect we
owe every person. It is respect arising out of identification with
the country, and there is no duty on anyone to identify with any
country. The claim is simply that that attitude is sometimes
(i.e., when certain moral conditions are met) appropriate.
Does it show that sometimes people who trust the government are justified in believing that the government has authority when it does not, or does it show that sometimes the government has authority over such people even though it does not
have authority or has only a more limited authority over people
who do not trust it? One can argue either way. On the one
hand, it may be thought desirable to separate epistemic from
substantive considerations, and to have an account that tends
to make governmental authority independent of individually
variable factors such as trust resulting from identification with
the country. On the other hand, as we saw, the service conception does incorporate epistemic elements into the conditions of
authority, and, as we shall see, it allows for considerable variability in the extent of governmental authority over the population over which it claims authority. So it may be that the better
view is to regard identification as affecting the conditions of legitimacy, and not merely the occasions on which it is justified
to believe that they are met. This way the account is closer to
familiar (and rational) attitudes that people have to authority.
H. PREEXISTING REASONS AND CONCRETIZATION
The account may appear unduly restrictive. It may appear
to exclude any power for governments to improve the economic
conditions of their citizens. For example, the authority may do
so by imposing taxes and using the revenue to subsidize training, which is useful for full employment and for economic development. Neither I nor other inhabitants have reason to impose taxes or subsidize training in the country. But that is a
misperception. To the extent that the inhabitants of a country
have reason to improve their own economic situation, they will
have reason to do so through a common authority in those matters where that authority will be capable of achieving that goal
better than they can do so by acting independently of it.
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Does it mean that I do have reason to raise taxes? Not necessarily, but the question stems from overlooking the fact that
typically reasons do not come singly, rather they are nested.
Typically, we have one reason because conforming to it is a way
of advancing another reason. The more general reasons apply
as a standard background to our activities, and are less affected
by changing circumstances, whereas the more specific reasons
that nest in them tend to apply during shorter periods and depend on conditions that are often liable to change. My reason to
improve my economic situation is an example of a relatively
general reason, not likely to disappear until my retirement or
even later, though its urgency and force may change over time.
A reason to change employment may derive from it. I may have
reason to change employment in order to improve my economic
condition. But it is a more short-term reason, which may disappear if, for example, I am offered promotion by my current employer, or through other circumstances.
People assigned the task of helping us do so by conforming
to or realizing some reasons that apply to us, reasons we have
ourselves. These reasons have others nested in them, which set
out ways of realizing them. But those nested reasons need not
be reasons for us. That is, those helping us may have good
grounds for pursuing the goals set by reasons that apply to us
in ways that are not open to us. Indeed, as the service conception of authority illustrates, they may be assigned the task of
helping us precisely because of that. Through their intervention
we acquire new ways of realizing the goals set by the general
background reasons, and thereby new reasons to take the actions that will do so.
There are various other ways in which the suppleness of
the service conception can be underestimated. In giving the following examples I do not wish to endorse their cogency. I mention them just to illustrate the power of the service conception.
For example, someone may believe that people, members of a
certain group, have a duty, perhaps a religious duty or a duty of
loyalty arising from some historical circumstances, to obey
some person or institution. In that case the normal justification
thesis is easily satisfied. By obeying that person or institution
one is discharging that duty. Or suppose that members of a certain group, perhaps an ethnic group, have a duty to obey someone who can command the allegiance of the group, a sort of national duty for the glory of the nation. Again, if anyone can
command the allegiance of the group then that person will sat-
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isfy the conditions of having authority under the service conception. Or suppose that one has a duty to obey whoever wins a
lottery; again the conditions of the service conception would be
met regarding anyone who wins the lottery. Some people believe that one has a duty to obey anyone who is elected by the
majority. Again, that is no problem for the service conception. If
that is so it simply shows that the conditions of the service conception are met regarding anyone who is so elected.20
I.

COORDINATION AND METACOORDINATION

A major, if not the main, factor in establishing the legitimacy of political authorities is their ability to secure coordination. Some writers, commenting on this fact, have gone further
and argued: (a) that the sole (or only major) function of political
authorities is to coordinate the conduct of those subject to them
for the achievement of some goods; (b) that coordination being
secured via a Lewis-type convention does not require an authority with a right to rule: all it requires is the ability to make
salient certain coordinative outcomes; and (c) that it follows
that political authorities, as such, do not enjoy a right to rule.

RAZ_3FMT

1032

04/20/2006 10:21:00 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:1003

that they all play diverse roles in some possible plan of action
that is likely to yield some sought-after results. This kind of coordination cannot generally be achieved via a Lewis-type convention. Third, one reason for this is that the need for coordination and the means for achieving it are not necessarily
generally known and are often a matter of controversy. Fourth,
that since the goals people actually have need not be desirable,
coordination aimed at securing these goals need not be desirable either. The coordinated schemes of action that political authorities should pursue are those to which people should be
committed, or those needed to secure goals that people should
have, which are not always the goals which they do have. Fifth,
that typically, when the political authority is otherwise legitimate and reasonably successful, it will also be rightly taken, at
least in some areas, to be an authority on the second order
question of when is coordination in place.
IV. THE QUALIFICATION OBJECTION
One possible reaction to the service conception is that it
misses its target. It describes the conditions under which an
authority is a good-enough authority. It articulates tests of success for authorities, but it does not explain what it is to be an
authority. It describes the conditions that have to hold if an authority is to be capable of successfully discharging its tasks, but
it is not and cannot be the case that everyone who can discharge a task well has that task. Not everyone who can be a
good prime minister of a country is the prime minister of that
country, not everyone who can be a good teacher in the primary
school of my neighborhood is a teacher in that school. Moreover, no one is a prime minister or a teacher just in virtue of
the fact that they can perform the task well. Something else
has to happen to give them the task, to make it their task.
To evaluate this point we should contrast theoretical and
practical authority. Theoretical authorities are experts whose
knowledge and understanding of the matter on which they are
authorities is both exceptionally extensive and remarkably systematic and secure, making them reliable guides on those matters. Their word is a reason for holding certain beliefs and discarding others. In that, it is like testimony: the reports of
witnesses about the events on which they report. But expert
advice is very different from witnesses’ testimony. First, normally their advice does not report their perceptual beliefs or
the content of their experiences. (The exceptions are cases
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where what we see is hard to understand, where experts may
be useful in telling us what we and they see.) Rather, it reports
inferential beliefs, conclusions they draw from evidence derived
from their own experience or that of others. Secondly, and as a
corollary, their advice does not depend on their advantageous
situation relative to the matter under consideration: unlike the
testimony of witnesses, they need not have been at the right
place at the right time to see or otherwise witness the events
they report about. They derive their conclusions not from observation, which requires an advantageous position, but by inference from evidence, including testimony, and that does not
require enjoying a privileged or advantageous position relative
to the events on which they advise. As a result, while testimony
bears only on past events, experts can also predict future
events.
These differences account for the normative differences between witnesses and experts. With witnesses all we have to do
is assess the reliability of their report: the quality of their eyesight, weather conditions, their attention at the time, their distance from the events reported, etc. With experts none of these
questions normally arises. What is at issue is their ability to
draw conclusions from the evidence. Often it is knowledge of
the theory, say some scientific theory, and at other times it is
breadth of experience and depth of understanding that establish their credentials as experts, i.e., as people who can reliably
infer one thing from another. Once their authority as experts is
established, it follows that our nonexpert evaluations of the
same evidence cannot reliably challenge theirs. I see the piece
of meat at the butchers, and its color makes me think that it is
not fresh. But I do not have experience or theory to back me up.
My expert friend reassures me that the meat is fresh, and I just
yield. If I accept my friend’s expertise, relative to me, I have no
choice. Theoretical advice preempts the reasons for belief that I
would have relied upon otherwise. Just as with any practical
authority, the point of a theoretical authority is to enable me to
conform to reason, this time reason for belief, better than I
would otherwise be able to do. This requires taking the expert
advice, and allowing it to preempt my own assessment of the
evidence. If I do not do that, I do not benefit from it.
Theoretical authority resembles practical authority in its
point (to improve conformity with reason) and in being preemptive, as well as in being relational both regarding who has to
take an authority’s word as authoritative, and regarding what
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matters: it is possible that I should take this expert’s word as
authoritative, because he knows much more than I do, but you
have no reason to do the same, as you know as much as he does
on these matters.
These similarities notwithstanding, there are significant
differences between theoretical and practical authorities. I
noted that, unlike testimony, some expertise can be the basis of
predictions of future events. But it cannot change anything.
The ability of practical authorities to improve coordination, a
factor entirely absent from the activities of theoretical authorities, makes them subject to derived reasons21 to secure preexisting goals in ways not otherwise possible. They can, as a result, change things in the world.
Furthermore, and it hardly needs saying, theoretical authorities, experts, cannot order us to believe one thing or another, and cannot impose duties to believe—the nature of belief
and belief formation excludes such duties. Belief formation, just
like actions, is responsive to reasons, but only actions, and not
the formation of beliefs, involve the will. Duties exist only when
(but not always even then) the response to reason involves the
will.
These points are associated with important differences of
idiom. For example, some people are authorities on eighteenthcentury farming methods, but they do not have authority over
anyone. I know nothing about eighteenth-century farming
methods and should take what they say as authoritative, but
they do not have authority over me. Similarly the notion of legitimate authority is confined to practical authority. People
may or may not be experts in or authorities on eighteenthcentury farming methods. But they cannot be de facto authorities or legitimate authorities on the subject. Finally, only regarding practical matters can we say that someone has authority, or lacks it. In theoretical matters, someone either is or is
not an authority, but no one has authority.
What have these points to do with the critique of the service conception, with the claim that it mistakes an analysis of
when an authority is good at what it is doing for an analysis of
what it is to be an authority? At first blush, they may suggest
that the critique is correct regarding practical authorities, but
21. Note that it is not merely that authorities create new reasons by issuing directives. This is true of theoretical authorities as well. Their very existence opens up opportunities, and thereby subjects them to new derived reasons, reasons to satisfy previously existing reasons in new ways.
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mistaken about theoretical authorities.
Since theoretical authorities cannot possess or lack legitimacy, and cannot impose duties (not even duties to believe),
they cannot require an additional condition beyond those of the
service conception. If they are qualified as authorities, they are
authorities. In fact, even the epistemic condition we noticed before, namely that their possession of authority is knowable to
those over whom they have authority, does not apply to theoretical authorities, which have no authority over anyone. The
greatest expert on eighteenth-century farming methods may be
a solitary scholar unknown to the academic community and unrecognized by anyone. He is still an authority, just in virtue of
his knowledge of his subject. Nothing more is needed.22 So the
objection fails regarding theoretical authorities.
Practical authorities, on the other hand, impose duties on
people. They have authority over people. They have normative
powers over people. To be authorities, so the argument goes,
they need more than the capacity to function well. They need to
be made authorities, not necessarily by being appointed to the
job, but something like an appointment has to be there.
However, the admission that the objection fails regarding
theoretical authorities seems to me to establish that it fails altogether. It is implausible to think that what is a successful
analysis of what it is to be an authority in theoretical matters
makes no contribution at all to an understanding of the notion
of authority, of what it is to have practical authority. Possibly,
the differences between the two kinds of authority mean that it
is a successful analysis of one kind, and only a partial analysis
of the other. But it is implausible to claim that it has nothing to
do with the analysis of the other. There is another reason to
doubt the objection. It seems implausible to think that one can
be a legitimate authority however bad one is at acting as an authority. If the primary point of authority, practical authority
included, is to improve conformity with reason, it is implausible
to think that someone who contributes not at all in that respect, someone who in fact makes us act more against reason
than we would do had we not tried to follow him, can have legitimate authority.

22. Of course normally we cannot know that he is an authority unless
someone else attests to it. But it seems best to assign the implication that no
one who is totally unrecognized can be an authority to the pragmatics of discourse.
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We can therefore reject the objection. But another more
modest objection is just around the corner. It says that regarding practical authorities, given their ability to change things, to
impose duties and confer rights, the service conception furnishes only part of their analysis. It states a necessary condition for being an authority, but not a sufficient one.
This objection is more plausible. But to succeed it needs to
meet one doubt: the differences between theoretical and practical authorities may lead to differences in what has to be established to confirm that they do meet the service conception’s criteria for legitimate authority. Would not those differences be
sufficient to show that not everyone who can be a good authority has practical authority?
Confining the discussion to political authorities, we know
that a major part of their role: improving public services, personal safety, security of contracts and other commercial transactions, requires them to be successful in coordinating the conduct of large numbers of people. That ability is not enough for
the performance of such tasks, but it is necessary for it. It follows that only bodies that enjoy de facto authority (i.e., that are
in fact followed or at least conformed with by considerable segments of the population) can have legitimate authority over all
these matters. Hence there cannot be an unknown political authority. Similarly, there cannot be a political authority that
does not exercise its authority, i.e., does not issue directives
that impose duties, confer rights, etc. We can contrast this with
theoretical authority: our expert in eighteenth-century farming
methods may never give any advice or express any opinions on
the matter. It is enough that he could, for his authority depends on his knowledge, not on his power over people, his ability to make them modify their behavior to conform to his directives, as does the legitimacy of political authorities.
Finally, but most importantly, given how things are in our
world, governments of the kind we are familiar with can only
succeed in meeting the conditions of legitimacy (according to
the service conception) if they have the authority to use and are
successful in the use of force against those who flout certain of
their directives. There is no need now to establish what are the
general conditions for the rightful use of force by governments.
For our purposes it is enough that such a right must exist for a
government to meet the two conditions of legitimacy, and that
it must be effectively used. This is an additional, double obstacle on the road to the possession of legitimate governmental au-
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thority. It is a normative obstacle: justifying the possession of a
moral right to use force; and a factual obstacle: being de facto
able to use it effectively. No such conditions need be met by
theoretical authorities. Does not the existence of these conditions show that the service conception explains not who would
be good had he been given authority, but who really has authority? At the very least they show that the service conception
recognizes and has some account of the difference between being qualified to hold authority, and having authority. The question is whether its account is adequate. That question is still
open. But the accusation that it simply confused qualification
for authority with authority fails.
V. CONSENT
Let us examine one contender for this missing element: the
consent of the subjects. On the view to be considered, the conditions of the service conception need to be met for consent to confer authority on anyone. To have authority, a person or body
must meet the necessary qualifications for holding authority.
The two conditions of the service conception state what the
qualifications are, and therefore, to qualify for having authority
anyone must meet them. But actually to have authority over
another requires the consent of that other as well.
Most commonly, however, the claim that all authority derives from consent is taken by its advocates to be based on
other considerations, independent of the preceding argument.
To use the familiar slogans, it cannot be—people say—that one
person is subject to the will of another except by his own choosing, expressed by his consent to be subject to that authority.
Some people take this view to be an application to the case
of authority of a broader thesis, namely that no obligations bind
anyone except by their own will. I will have to disregard that
view, which takes us too far afield for the present occasion. I
will focus on the more limited view that at least all people who
are persons, who are autonomous agents, cannot be subject to
the will of another except by choice. No one can have authority
over us and tell us what to do without our consent.
We nevertheless assume that there can be duties without
the consent of the person bound. I have a duty to respect others, which does not depend on my consent to respect others, let
alone on my consent to an obligation to do so. For what, then, is
consent a prerequisite? One line of argument will have it that
no obligation whose discharge affects a person can be valid
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without his consent. But that seems highly implausible. Other
people’s obligation to respect me, not to kill me, as well as their
duty to protect the environment, for example, affect me quite
deeply, and they nevertheless have them regardless of my consent. Nor, it seems plausible to think, can I release them from
these obligations. I cannot release them from their obligation to
protect the environment, for its impact on me is not central to
its justification. But nor can I release people from their duty to
respect me, or my humanity, as Kant would have said, even
though I am central to its justification. To be sure, my consent
can turn acts that would, without it, breach that duty, into innocuous acts. For example, by giving you my car as a gift I turn
your driving away in it from theft to a permissible handling of
your own property. But the effect of my consent presupposes
the existence of a prior duty, and its scope (Can I consent to be
killed? Or to become a slave?) is determined by that duty,
which itself exists independently of consent.
So we turn to the most plausible suggestion: namely that
no one can intentionally impose an obligation on a person without the consent of its subject. This idea is supposed to tie up
with the ideal of personal autonomy. What makes obligations
intentionally created by another a special case requiring consent? It cannot be the content of these obligations, for the demand for consent is not made to depend on the content of the
obligations. It depends on their source. Given that only one
thing is known of the source, namely that it is supposed to be
an authority, the demand for consent seems to depend on the
general relationship that is indicated: a relationship of one person being subject to the will of another.
Do you have the impression that we have come full circle?
Have we not considered that precise point? Was it not the
moral question that was answered earlier? If that answer was
good, and nothing was said to indicate otherwise, why are we
back with it? Presumably there is a residual feeling that the
earlier reply did not cover all aspects of the moral problem.
What is left? How are we to find it? The way to an answer was
indicated earlier. We saw that consent is a source of obligation
only when some considerations, themselves independent of consent, vindicate its being such a source. And those considerations would also determine what kind of consent is required to
legitimize the authority and determine over what matters it
will reign.
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Oddly, it is this test that I find no way of meeting. The
moral question was about the legitimacy of one person being
subject to the will of another. But that problem cannot be
solved by consent. Suppose you say to me: “I impose on you an
obligation to come to my party tomorrow,” (and you may add:
“provided of course that you agree”), and I reply: “I agree.” I
definitely consented to come to your party. I may even have
promised to do so. But clearly whatever you said, you did not
impose an obligation on me. The obligation is entirely my own
creation. You may have invited me in a funny way, or expressed a strong desire that I should come, again in a funny
way. But you did not obligate me to come.
Now suppose you say to me: “You will have an obligation to
do whatever I tell you to do,” or: “Whenever I tell you to do
something that in my judgment you should do anyway, you will
have a duty to do it, provided you now agree to this.” If you tell
me something like that and I agree, then while until I agreed,
and at the moment of agreeing, I was not subject to your will;
once I agree I am subject to you will. It is analogous to becoming a slave. I was free, and I lost my freedom. Here, I was independent of your will, and now I am subject to your will. Of
course it is not the case that I am subject to your will because I
want to be. I may have wanted it when I consented. But once I
consented, what I want becomes immaterial. I am subject to
your will whether I want to or not. Does not that raise the
moral problem, rather than answer it?
Still, as I said, the feeling persists that the solution to the
moral question given before left some of our concerns unanswered. It saw the issue as one having some other person decide for one rather than deciding for oneself. The emphasis was
on “not deciding for oneself.” It showed that there is no objection to that, that we should approve of that when it makes us
conform better with reason. The argument drew analogies between authorities, agents, mechanical devices, and so on. And
that is where it falls short. It did not notice that while they are
all cases of not deciding for oneself, there is a difference between these cases and that of authority, for only authority involves subjecting our will to that of another, and that is not
merely a matter of not deciding for oneself.
Let us concede that the problem exists, that perhaps the
solution offered so far ignores it. It remains the fact that consent does not solve the problem. It can solve the problem only
when there is a reason for such consent to bind us, and there is
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none, other than the one that can dispense with consent but
cannot explain why a single act of consent can subject us for life
to the will of another, i.e., that the authority will make us better conform to reason. It should be noted that in denying that
consent is necessary for legitimacy, I am not denying that it
has some significance. I suspect that the way it is treated in the
law of some countries shows that it is regarded as significant,
but not to the legitimacy of an authority. Naturalized citizens
and the holders of some offices of state are often required to express formal consent, though not necessarily to the legitimacy
of the authority. Since the law claims authority over all of us
but requires consent from some only, it does not regard consent
as necessary for its authority. But the requirement of consent
may show that it is taken to express some more specific attitude(s) that are taken to be required in some contexts in particular. Beyond the law we may feel that consent makes a difference: “now (having consented) you have only yourself to
blame,” we sometimes say. I cannot inquire here into such possibilities, but will simply reiterate that, for the reasons given,
they do not establish that consent is a condition of authority.
Perhaps, however, the popularity of consent-based explanations of authority has something to tell us. Perhaps while being mistaken, it points in the right direction. The question is a
question of appropriation. The aspect of the moral problem we
are confronting is not the limits to one’s freedom that the law
or other authoritative directives pose. It is that the limits are
imposed deliberately, and that they are imposed by another.
They are not limits set by me. Consent explanations appeal because they seek to make the limits the agent’s own. They are
chimerical because they fail to do that. They remain imposed
limits, deliberately imposed by another. My historical consent
cannot have the significance placed on it; it cannot make the
limits my own.
What we need, you may think, is another way of explaining appropriation, of explaining how the commands of authority
can lose the character of subjection of one person to the will of
another. That is where the search for collective identities begins.
VI. COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES
The flaw in consent accounts is that they fly in the face of
reality. They claim that what is not mine is mine, in spite of the
patent fact that it is binding on me regardless of my will, and
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often against my will. The best that can be said for them is that
they make each of us slaves of our own decisions when young.
But there is another way. A rule or directive may be neither
imposed on me by another nor made by me. It could be made by
“us,” by a collectivity of which I am a part. The simplest and
least controversial examples derive from limited collective enterprises. We, six friends, may go on an adventure trip together, or organize a party or a conference together. And we
may decide, by mutual consultation, what to do in pursuing our
joint venture, decisions that bind each and all of us. While none
of them is made by me, none of them is imposed on me by the
will of another. They are made by us. Is it not an additional
necessary condition of the legitimacy of authority that it acts
for a collectivity so that its directives are not imposed on members of that group, but are their decisions, collectively taken,
perhaps through their agents or representatives?
A. ARE AUTHORITIES ACTING FOR THE PEOPLE?:
COLLECTIVITIES AND COLLECTIVE ACTIONS
There is discourse about collectivities, their identity and
action, and how we relate to them when we say “we,” meaning
Oxford University, “did this or that” or “hold these ideals high,”
etc. This is comprehensible discourse, therefore it has truth
conditions, and there are states of affairs in virtue of which
such statements are true or false.
I have no general reason to think that there are no practical authorities, i.e., authorities with a right to rule or command, which are not the organs of collectivities in the way in
which governments are the organs of countries or of states. But
it may well be that cases in which authorities act for collectivities and are organs of collectivities are typical. They may be
the paradigm in relation to which we understand all authorities. So let us allow that point, necessary for the success of the
thought that the answer to the moral problem is that authorities’ actions are our actions.
This is not the place to investigate the truth conditions of
propositions about collective action. But one aspect of such an
investigation is important for our purpose: is it the case that a
university, a country, a government, or whatever other collectivity, is my university, country or government only if I identify
with it?
The notion of identification is both important and obscure,
but I think that there can be no doubt that the answer to the

RAZ_3FMT

1042

04/20/2006 10:21:00 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:1003

question is negative. Oxford University is my university
whether I identify with it or not. Your country is your country
whether you like it or not, whether you are alienated from it or
not, and this government is the government of all the people of
this country however much they hate it. There were times in
the past when many Anglo-Irish did not identify with Eire and
its government. They did not regard it as their state and their
government. But Eire was their state, and its government was
their government. Not infrequently we find in a country individuals or groups that do not and cannot bring themselves to
identify with their country or to regard its government as their
own. They will not use the language of “we,” as in “we just
changed the law to make it harder for asylum seekers to stay in
the country.” Their refusal, often their inability to use such locutions, is highly significant, but it does not change the fact
that that is their country, their law, and their government.
B. IS THE MORAL PROBLEM SOLVED WHEN THE AUTHORITY’S
ACTION IS OURS?
The fact that people can be alienated from their countries,
that they may refuse to talk of what “we” did when talking of
their countries, raises severe doubts about the contention that
the answer to the moral problem is that the commands of authorities are our commands, even while we are their subjects.
Tell this to the people who are alienated from their country or
from their regime. Tell them that it is they who passed the laws
that they regard as anathema, etc. It is a sad form of trickery to
think that its being the authority of their country makes its
command their command in any sense that solves the moral
problem.
One response to this point is to say that there is a different
sense of belonging, of a group being ours, of its actions being
our actions, a sense that does bridge the gap we are looking at.
Maybe. There may be a sense of belonging to a country, or identification with its regime (i.e., its political constitution), a sense
that would enable people to affirm that the actions of authorities they identify with are their actions—thus dissolving the
moral problem. The question is: does this mean that the legitimate power of authorities is limited to people who so identify
with the collectivities that the authorities represent? Does it
mean, for example, that the Anglo-Irish who did not identify
with Eire and its government were not subject to its authority,
that they were not subject to the law of Eire?
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The problem of the limits of the state’s authority is even
more far reaching. We tend to believe that states have some extraterritorial jurisdiction, and that in any case they have territorial jurisdiction over all people within the boundaries of the
state. But we do not expect visitors to identify with the state or
the regime. It may be a good thing if the population of a country identifies with it, and with its regime. But there is no reasonable argument to deny that where the state has any legitimate authority at all its authority reaches beyond ruling those
who identify with it.
Identification may play an important role in a theory of legitimacy in another way. It may be said that it is a requirement
of the legitimacy of the state, and of its authorities, that it
would be reasonable of its citizens to identify with it. Identification, the thought is, is not a brute fact, it is an attitude, which
like beliefs, emotions and desires, is responsive to reasons.
There are, or can be, reasons to identify and reasons not to
identify. Hence sometimes identifying is reasonable and at others it is not.23 It is, so it may be claimed, a condition of the legitimacy of an authority that it will be reasonable for its subjects to identify themselves with it. That may be so, at least in
the case of some authorities. But not surprisingly I believe that
the service conception provides the conditions for the fulfillment of this requirement (the others having to do with the relations of the individual to the authority or to the body in the
name of which it acts). So that thought offers neither a criticism of nor a supplementation to the service conception account
of authority.
C. MUST LEGITIMATE AUTHORITIES BE ALSO ACTING FOR
COLLECTIVITIES AND DOES IT MATTER?
This brief argument relies on the fact that people, including us, who believe that political authorities can ever be legitimate, hold views about their legitimacy in many concrete cases
that cannot be reconciled with the view that political bodies
have legitimate authority only over people who identify with
them, or with the regimes for which they act. It is open to some
to maintain that we should revise our beliefs about the scope of
authority. My sense is that this would be a mistake. The problem of appropriation, to which identification is supposed to be
23. Some people would say that sometimes one should or has a duty to
identify, though I doubt that.
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the answer, is a misguided question. It is not part of our normal understanding of authority that its actions are the actions
of its subjects. On the contrary, the normal understanding is
that authority involves a hierarchical relationship, that it involves an imposition on the subject. The service conception explains how and when such power can be justified, at least in
the sense of being for the good. The quest for a solution to the
appropriation problem is perhaps best seen as an aspirational
ideal: it would be good, desirable, to have the bulk of those subject to a political authority identify with the regime for which it
acts. But identification should not be thought of as a condition
of legitimacy.

